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OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
A grand jury returned a four-count indictment charging
Michael Siegel, with transmission of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (a)(1), and (b)(1) (Count 1);
attempted transmission of child pornography by computer, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (a)(1) and (b)(1) (Count 2);
transmission of obscenity by computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
3§ 1462 (Count 3) and possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) (Count 4).
Siegel pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the indictment.  The
government, in turn, agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of
the indictment. The Revised Presentence Report  placed Siegel
in a criminal history III category based on four previous
criminal history points, a result of several incidents of “indecent
assault.”  Siegel objected to the calculation of the criminal
history category,  arguing that his criminal history category
should have been a II, based upon three criminal history points,
rather than a III, which is based on four criminal history points.
The parties’ disagreement stemmed from whether the two
counts of indecent assault referenced in the report were “crimes
of violence,” adding one criminal history category point to
Siegel’s sentencing calculation.
4The District Court, during a sentencing hearing,
overruled Siegel’s objection, noting that the victims’ ages
rendered them unable to consent to the conduct for which Siegel
was convicted.  Given the inability of the victims to consent, the
District Court reasoned that Siegel’s conduct necessarily
qualified as a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the
Sentencing Guidelines:
I have reviewed the case law and I have reviewed
the arguments by both, and I believe that the
criminal history calculations that were made are
appropriate under the law, that unlawful force as
recited by the Government is force that is directed
against a person without a person’s consent, and
force itself means the unlawful or wrongful action
is meant.
It seems that when we’re dealing with minors
who, by law, cannot consent, you are forcing
them to engage in conduct.  Therefore, I believe
that the criminal history points were appropriately
assigned . . . even though they were related,
because they involve a crime of violence.
5Accordingly, the District Court assigned Siegel four criminal
history points, calculated the corresponding Sentencing
Guideline range, and sentenced Siegel within that range to 65
months of incarceration.  
I.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231.  Our jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as this
is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered
by the District Court.  
We review a district court’s factual determinations
underlying the application of the Sentencing Guidelines for clear
error.  United States v. McMillen, 917 F.2d 773, 774 (3d Cir.
1990).  We exercise plenary review, however, over a District
Court’s interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines.  See United
States v. Lennon, 372 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Taylor, 98 F 3d. 768, 770 (3d Cir. 1996).
1. A determination whether a prior offense is a “crime of
violence” is a legal question. See United States v. McQuilkin,
97 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir.1996) (“The proper construction of
the term “crime of violence” is a legal question····”). 
6
II.
The question presented here is whether Siegel’s
conviction for indecent assault under Pennsylvania law
constitutes a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the
Sentencing Guidelines.   We conclude that it does and will1
affirm the District Court’s sentence.
A.
Siegel’s sentence was calculated pursuant to the 2001
Sentencing Guidelines.  According to § 4B1.2 of the Sentencing
Guidelines, the section under which the District Court imposed
the disputed criminal history point:
The term “crime of violence” means any offense
under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that--
7(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person
of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).  The Commentary accompanying section
4B1.2 of the Guidelines provides further insight into the
meaning of “crime of violence.”  The Commentary defines
“crime of violence” as follows:
“Crime of violence” includes murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion,
extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a
dwelling. Other offenses are included as “crimes
of violence” if (A) that offense has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(B) the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged)
in the count of which the defendant was convicted
involved use of explosives (including any
explosive material or destructive device) or, by its
8nature, presented a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another (emphasis added).
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 n.1.   
B.
We have stated that when a sentencing court is
determining whether a prior crime meets the test of § 4B1.2, it
should begin with the language of the statute and if that is clear,
it should not look beyond the statute's text to the actual conduct.
United States v. Shabazz, 233 F.3d 730, 732 (3d Cir.  2000).  We
generally employ the "formal categorical approach," announced
in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109
L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), to determine whether an offense falls
within the category of "crime of violence." See Singh v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2004). Using that analysis, a
court "must look only to the statutory definitions" of the
specified offense, and may not "consider other evidence
9concerning ... the particular facts underlying [a] conviction[ ]."
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
We apply that approach unless (1) "the language of the
particular state statute at issue invite[s] inquiry into the
underlying facts of the case," or (2) "the disjunctive phrasing of
the statute similarly invites inquiry into the specifics of the
conviction." Singh, 383 F.3d at 148; see also Garcia v. Atty.
Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Singh, 383 F.3d
at 161).  Statutory phrases that have “relatively unitary
categorical concepts” like “forgery,” “burglary,” “crime of
violence,” and “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” do
not invite an inquiry into the facts underlying the conviction.
Joseph v. Atty. Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Garcia, 462 F.3d at 290).
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C.
Under the categorical approach, we begin our analysis
with the Pennsylvania statute, which defines indecent assault as
follows:
A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person
has indecent contact with the complainant, causes
the complainant to have indecent contact with the
person or intentionally causes the complainant to
come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or
feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in
the person or the complainant and:
(1) the person does so without the complainant’s
consent;
(2) the person does so by forcible compulsion;
(3) the person does so by threat of forcible
compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution;
(4) the complainant is unconscious or the person
knows that the complainant is unaware that the
indecent contact is occurring;
(5) the person has substantially impaired the
complainant’s power to appraise or control his or
11
her conduct by administering or employing,
without the knowledge of the complainant, drugs,
intoxicants or other means for the purpose of
preventing resistance;
(6) the complainant suffers from a mental
disability which renders the complainant
incapable of consent;
(7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age; or
(8) the complainant is less than 16 years of age
and the person is four or more years older than the
complainant and the complainant and the person
are not married to each other.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3126 (2000).  “Indecent assault” under
Pennsylvania law, 18 PA.. CONS. STAT. § 3126(a)(1-2), is
defined as consisting of “indecent contact.” “Indecent contact,”
in turn, is defined as touching “for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire in either person.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3101; see also Johnson v. Elk Lake School Dist., 283 F.3d 138,
157 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Here, the Pennsylvania statute describes three distinct
offenses, any or all of which constitute “indecent assault”:
indecent contact, causing the victim to have indecent contact
with the offender, or intentionally causing the victim to come
into contact with various bodily fluids. Further, the offense of
indecent assault requires lack of consent, in various forms, by
the victim.  The key to determining the disjunctive nature of a
statutory definition is whether the provision is disjunctive in a
relevant sense; not necessarily whether the statute is formally
divided into separate subsections.  See Singh, 383 F.3d 163.
This statute is disjunctive.  It contemplates no less than  eight
d i f f e r e n t — a l t h o u g h  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m u t u a l l y
exclusive—scenarios which could constitute indecent assault.
These scenarios fall into two categories.  The first category,
found in §§ 3126(1)-(3), forbids indecent contact between the
perpetrator and victim because the victim, although capable of
13
consenting to the conduct at issue, did not.  By contrast, §§
3126(4)-(8) criminalizes conduct to which the victim was
incapable of consenting for one reason or another.   Clearly, the
statute invites inquiry into the  underlying facts of the case
because we are unable to determine from the face of the statute
which crime or crimes Siegel pleaded guilty to.  Therefore, the
statute is disjunctive in a relevant sense and departure from the
categorical approach is appropriate under Singh, 383 F.3d at
162.  
Commonly, the best way to resolve the question raised by
a conviction under a statute phrased in the disjunctive, or
structured in outline form, will be to look to the charging
instrument or to the plea colloquy.  Id. at 163 (citing Valansi v.
Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Here, the charging
documents — the criminal informations pertaining to the
assaults — do not specify which statutory provision Siegel
14
allegedly violated.  Rather, the information recites verbatim all
eight statutory categories criminalized by § 3126.  Siegel
suggests,  therefore, that the Pennsylvania statute is ambiguous.
Specifically, while he concedes that by their terms, only two of
the eight provisions of  § 3126—subsections 2 and 3—qualify
as “forcible sexual offenses,” he maintains that it was
impossible for the District Court to have determined that his
indecent assaults fell within these two subsections, because it
was equally likely that he had pleaded guilty to violating one of
the remaining six statutory sections.  
Siegel’s argument is premised on the assumption that
only certain provisions of § 3126 involve the use of force.  The
Government counters, arguing that where, as here, the victim of
the indecent assault was a minor, any violation of § 3126
necessarily constitutes a “forcible sexual offense” because the
15
minor was legally incapable of consent.  The District Court
agreed, noting, 
It seems that when we’re dealing with minors
who, by law, cannot consent, you are forcing
them to engage in conduct.  Therefore, I believe
that the criminal history points were appropriately
assigned.  
Although we ultimately agree that a violation of 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3126 which involves a minor is a “forcible sexual
offense,”and therefore, a “rime of violence,”we disagree with
the District Court’s reasoning.  Equating lack of consent with
force proves too much.  If lack of consent were synonymous
with force, many crimes of stealth or surprise — or indeed
crimes which involve insignificant or minor touching — could
be shoehorned into “crimes of violence.”  The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has persuasively articulated the fallacy
of equating force with the absence of consent:
16
An inference of violence from mere
unconsen ted - to  p h ysica l  con tac t ,  the
government’s first reason for arguing that every
felonious sexual act with a minor is per se a crime
of violence, would not wash in this circuit. It
would transform any unconsented-to touching that
the law has made a felony into a crime of
violence, including picking a person’s pocket, a
crime that we have held is not a crime of
violence.”
United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 1997).
The plea colloquy is of no help because it is not
available.  A transcript of a telephone conference between the
District Judge and counsel about the transcript of the plea
colloquy contains the Government’s admission that
We have not made any progress.  We have, I
think, given Delaware County an opportunity to
get the records.  We had pretty much constant
contact with them for the last two months.  They
told us they needed two months in order to be
able to find the papers.  We impressed upon them
the significance of it. We’ve spoken to the
supervisor in question and he has indicated that
they needed about two months and they can’t find
it.  They say because it’s eight years old and it’s
17
in a warehouse, that they have looked for it.  It’s
just that they’ve been unable to locate it.
Since its decision in Taylor, however, the Supreme Court has
looked at the categorical approach and modifications thereto in
the context of situations where, like here, a defendant has
pleaded guilty to a prior offense.  In Shepard  v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that “a later court determining the
character of an admitted [prior conviction] is generally limited
to examining the statutory definition, charging document,
written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any
explicit factfinding by the trial judge to which the defendant
assented,” or other “comparable judicial record[s]” of the prior
conviction. 544 U.S. 13, 16-17 (2005).  Thus, given Shepard’s
strictures on review, the vagueness of the Pennsylvania charging
documents, and the absence of the plea colloquy from Siegel’s
sentencing hearing in Pennsylvania court, Siegel argues that it
2. Judge Sloviter believes that a Presentence Report
ordinarily does not satisfy the demand for evidentiary
(continued...)
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was impossible for the District Court to determine that Siegel’s
indecent assaults involved the use of force.  We are not
persuaded.
We note that there is a description of the offense conduct
in the Presentence Report, which states that Siegel actually
physically restrained and forced the victim in both instances to
accede to his assaults.  Indeed, the Presentence Report describes
the June 17, 2002 assault this way:
[The victim] stated the [Siegel] sat down beside
her and started touching and grabbing her breasts.
[The victim] stated she pushed [Siegel’s] hand
away and told him to stop.  [The victim] then got
off the couch and went out to a porch area, but
[Siegel] followed her, forced her against a railing,
and placed his hand under her shirt and fondled
her breasts.  
PSR § 46.   2
2. (...continued)
certainty required by Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13
(2005), before a prior conviction can be used as a predicate
offense for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.  She joins
the majority in this case because it is possible to regard
Siegel’s failure to object to the facts in the Presentence Report
as an admission, which the Supreme Court in Shepard stated
satisfies its standard of competent evidence.  Id. at 26.  She
awaits further amplification as to the application of Shepard
to Presentence Reports by the Supreme Court or this court.
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Moreover, the record makes clear that Siegel received the
Presentence Report — including the description of the indecent
assaults in issue — before his sentencing hearing and was given
the opportunity to file objections.  There is nothing in this
record showing that Siegel objected to the factual description of
the assaults, nor has he challenged these descriptions on  appeal.
Thus the Presentence Report – a factual record adopted by
Siegel by his failure to object –  contains a statement of the facts
underlying the indecent assaults.  
20
In United States v. Cullen, the Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit held that “[b]y not objecting to the PSR’s factual
allegations, [the defendant] has admitted them.”   432 F.3d 903,
905 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). We agree, and hold that
the facts averred in the PSR acceded to by Siegel avoid the
“collateral trial,” and “judicial factfinding”  preempted by the
Court’s holding in Shepard.  
IV.
For these reasons we will affirm Siegel’s sentence.
